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Abstract For a country fractionalized in competing factions, each owning part of the stock
of natural exhaustible resources, or with insecure property rights, we analyze how resources
are transformed into productive capital to sustain consumption. We allow property rights to
improve as the country transforms natural resources into capital. The ensuing power struggle
about the control of resources is solved as a non-cooperative differential game. Prices of
resources and depletion increase faster than suggested by the Hotelling rule, especially with
many competing factions and less secure property rights. As a result, the country substitutes
away from resources to capital too rapidly and invests more than predicted by the Hartwick
rule. The theory suggests that power struggle boosts output but depresses aggregate consump-
tion and welfare, especially in highly fractionalized countries with less secure property rights.
Also, adjusted net saving estimates calculated by the World Bank using market prices over-
estimate welfare-based measures of genuine saving. Since our theory suggests that genuine
saving is zero while empirically they are negative in resource-rich, fractionalized countries,
we suggest ways of resolving this puzzle.
Keywords Exhaustible resources · Hotelling rule · Hartwick rule · Capital ·
Sustainable consumption · Fractionalization · Seepage · Interconnected pools ·
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1 Introduction
The idea that rents from exhaustible natural resources should be saved and reinvested in pro-
ductive capital is common in policy circles. It has first been formalized by Hartwick (1977)
within the context of the canonical closed economy model of resource extraction, capital
formation, consumption and growth developed by Solow (1974). With Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction, the capital stock grows at a linear rate with the saving rate equal to the constant share
of exhaustible natural resource in value added, all rents from resources are reinvested and
consumption is sustained at a constant level. This way of transforming exhaustible natural
resources into productive capital has become known as the Hartwick rule.1 To obtain this
result, prices of natural resources must grow at the market rate of interest for the country to be
indifferent between keeping natural resources in the ground or depleting them and obtaining
a market return. This is, of course, the Hotelling rule first stated by Hotelling (1931).
Our principle objective is to derive political counterparts of the Hartwick and Hotelling
rules by extending the analysis of Solow (1974) and Hartwick (1977) to a fractionalized
economy, i.e., an economy with competing factions, each owning part of the nation’s stock
of exhaustible natural resources. Ownership rights on the stock owned by each group are,
however, not secure, because of seepage between different interconnected fields or reservoirs
of natural resources.2 Our analysis is thus concerned with non-renewable natural resources
that are prone to seepage, such as oil, gas or water, and not with the whole range of exhaustible
reserves to which the Hotelling rule applies. Seepage of resources between interconnected
fields or reservoirs introduces a dynamic common-pool problem, especially if the rate of
seepage is substantial. In the dynamic interconnected pool problem that is being studied each
pool owner has legal rights to his pool of resources but nevertheless the pool owner faces
non-instantaneous seepage from or to neighboring pools. If seepage is instantaneous, it is no
longer feasible to enforce property rights and our problem reduces to the familiar dynamic
common pool problem.
One of our key analytical results is that competing factions extract natural resources too
fast for fear of their reserves seeping to other fields and that this leads to a lower level of
sustainable consumption. However, our main focus is on how economic development leads
to better property rights and thus to less infringement of property rights. The degree to which
1 Dixit et al. (1980) and Dasgupta and Mitra (1983) discuss the Hartwick rule from the point of view of max-
min egalitarianism. However, with a positive elasticity of intertemporal substitution, private consumption will
not be constant. If consumption is initially held below its max- min level, capital is accumulated sufficiently fast
to ensure that later generations enjoy increasing levels of consumption. While resource use declines to zero,
unlimited growth in consumption and output is feasible. The Euler equation for consumption growth implies
that, as long as the rate of time preference is strictly positive, the capital stock must ultimately go to zero to
ensure that growth in private consumption is non-negative. It is thus optimal to let consumption, output and
capital vanish in the long run even though it is feasible to avoid such a doomsday scenario. Future generations
are thus doomed. From a utilitarian perspective this does not matter as the benefit to early generations exceeds
the loss to later generations. Obviously, it is hard on ethical grounds to defend such an outcome. This is why
the max- min egalitarian outcome seems preferable.
2 Over-pumping of water out of once plentiful groundwater aquifers for irrigation purposes is one of the
main reasons for water shortages from the High plains of the United States to the Gangetic Plain of northern
India to Australia (Sachs 2008). Due to seepage and the unregulated and indiscriminate access to groundwater
resources, much of this over-pumping arises from a classic common-pool problem. Over-pumping causes not
only water shortages, but also leads to contamination with salt water, poisoning and collapse of aquifers. Fish
does not respect territorial waters, but is a renewable resource.
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individual fields can be encroached by others thus decreases with economic development.
We thus offer a political economy explanation of why fractionalized resource-rich countries
deplete their natural resources faster and end up with lower levels of sustainable consumption
than homogenous societies, especially if property rights are more insecure. Each one of the
rival groups tries to deplete their natural resources before it seeps away or is grabbed by other
groups. Since property rights for natural resources are badly defined, the power struggle
becomes more intense and makes competing groups more impatient. As a result, the country
depletes natural resources faster than dictated by the Hotelling rule.
We show that fractionalized countries substitute away from natural resources to capital in
production at a too rapid rate from a social perspective so that they save and invest more than
a homogenous society. We also show that fractionalization into different resource-owning
groups and less secure property rights drive the non-cooperative saving rate above the pro-
duction share of natural resources. The interest rate and the output-capital ratio gradually
fall to zero. We show that the power struggle in a fractionalized society with insecure prop-
erty rights leads to faster depletion of natural resources and consequently a higher saving
and investment rate. This boosts output. However, due to the higher savings rate, a smaller
proportion of output is devoted to consumption. This is why, despite the increase in output,
fractionalization and less secure property rights depress the sustainable level of aggregate
consumption and social welfare, especially if there are many rival factions and property rights
are less secure.
Confronting our theory with the empirical facts, we see that oil-rich countries indeed invest
a substantial proportion of their oil revenues in human and physical capital and the data are
not inconsistent with their rates of oil depletion and their rates of investment being exces-
sively high while the sustainable level of consumption is excessively low from a social point
of view. The recent bursting of real-estate booms in oil-rich countries such as Kazakhstan
(Kuralbayeva et al. 2010) and the Gulf States seems to suggest that investment rates might
have been excessive and may not have been directed at productive projects.
However, there is an empirical puzzle which our theory is not yet able to address, namely
that the data suggest that resource-rich countries have negative genuine saving while our
theory of rapacious resource depletion suggests that genuine saving is zero even in fraction-
alized societies with insecure property rights if, following Arrow et al. (2003), welfare-based
accounting prices are used to value the cost of resource depletion. Zero genuine saving
occurs, because the too rapid depletion of natural resources is in line with the too rapid
accumulation of physical capital by each group. The empirical puzzle is even more severe,
since true genuine saving may be even more negative than the negative adjusted net saving
estimates reported by the World Bank for many resource-rich countries, especially if they
have a high degree of fractionalization and insecure property rights. The reason for this data
anomaly is that the correct accounting price corresponds to the market price that prevails in a
homogenous society, and is thus higher than the market price that prevails in a fractionalized
society. Hence, the cost of resource depletion is under-estimated as the World Bank uses
market prices instead of accounting prices so that net adjusted saving gives a too flattering
indication of genuine saving.
Be that as it may, our theory does not resolve the empirical puzzle of negative genuine
saving. In future work we may make progress on this if we address political economy of
politicians with less extreme intergenerational equity concerns than is customary in the liter-
ature on exhaustible natural resources. It would also help to allow for absorption constraints,
so that the too rapid investment cannot be immediately put to productive use and is likely to
be invested in inefficient partisan, illiquid projects (e.g., Robinson and Torvik 2005; Collier
et al. 2010). Furthermore, fighting about the share of natural resources may be wasteful in
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terms of foregone labor income, corruption, war, etcetera and this may help to explain the
empirically observed negative genuine saving rates. The political economy of resource-rich
countries (e.g., Hodler 2006; Caselli 2006; Caselli and Cunnigham 2009) is not concerned
with the dynamics of exhaustible natural resources, but will be a source of inspiration for
future theoretical work on explaining this empirical puzzle.
For example, our analysis does not deal with asymmetries as we suppose that all factions
are identical with the same initial stocks of natural resources, the same level of productivity,
and the same population size and abstract from the possibility that seepage may benefit some
resource owners more than others. We also do not consider a ruler supported by an elite
or selectorate which owns the resource, decides on its extraction and to whom the resource
proceedings accrue, but focus instead on factions wrestling resource rents from each other,
but not from the ruler. If there was a ruler, Caselli (2006) shows, abstracting from Hotelling
features of resource depletion, that power struggles increase the effective discount rate of
the governing group and that as a result this elite makes fewer investments in the long-run
development of the economy. Interestingly, this goes against our result which suggests that
rapacious depletion rates much lead to excessive investments. Such ruler-follower models and
the importance of understanding how natural resources might impact the political survival of
the ruler are also discussed in Caselli and Cunnigham (2009). Most of the aforementioned
asymmetries feature in the real world, but are not the focus of this paper. Instead, we focus
at the Hotelling model of non-cooperative resource depletion and how this interacts with the
important question of genuine saving and sustainable consumption.3
Our general equilibrium analysis is related to the earlier literature on oligopoly extraction
of a common property natural resource in partial equilibrium, which stresses the importance
of the period of commitment and the importance of the feedback Nash and the open-loop
Nash equilibrium solutions (e.g., Reinganum and Stokey 1985; van der Ploeg 1987; Karp
1992). The main insight of this literature is that in a non-cooperative context groups tap the
common stock of natural resources more quickly, especially if the period of commitment is
short as in the feedback Nash equilibrium solution where the period of commitment is zero.
The open-loop Nash equilibrium solution has an infinite period of commitment and is rele-
vant when different factions in society cannot monitor each others’ resource stocks. With this
solution the dynamic distortions arising from the common pool problem are less severe. We
focus on the open-loop Nash equilibrium solution mainly because it leads to a more tracta-
ble analysis with closed-form analytical solutions. Furthermore, under this solution concept
an economy with no seepage and/or perfect property rights turns out to be Pareto efficient
and thus provides a useful benchmark. We thus focus at the inefficiencies caused by finite
seepage rates and less than perfect property rights and analyze how this affects the rate at
which natural resources are being tapped (and thus abstract from the additional efficiencies
that may result from smaller periods of commitment including the zero period of commit-
ment assumed in the feedback Nash equilibrium solution). The open-loop Nash equilibrium
solution allows one to analyze how the Hartwick rule of reinvesting the Hotelling scarcity
rents into various forms of productive capital is affected by moving from an assumption of
common-pool open-access natural resources to an assumption of fields of natural resources
owned by different groups but suffering from common-pool problems due to seepage of
natural resources or imperfect property rights.
Our analysis is also related to that of the voracity effect in societies with competing groups
and lack of effective property rights. Lane and Tornell (1996) and Tornell and Lane (1999)
3 Asymmetric Stackelberg leader-follower models of natural resource depletion with a monopolistic leader
(the OPEC) and a competitive fringe have been analyzed and lead to time consistency issues and some other
intricate game-theroretic issues (Groot et al. 2003).
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have demonstrated within the context of a dynamic common-pool problem that an increase
in the raw return on the common asset above the return on private assets increases the extent
of rent seeking, depresses saving and investment and thus curbs the rate of economic growth
and makes a country worse off from a social perspective. The voracity effect thus arises from
a dynamic common-pool problem, whereby each group tries to grab more of the common
asset before the other groups do so. We analyze, in contrast, a dynamic interconnected-pool
problem with common-pool properties by extending van der Ploeg (2010a) who studies gen-
uine saving and voracious depletion within the context of a common-pool model with a pure
common exhaustible natural resource and no property rights at all on natural resources. The
main contribution of this paper is thus to analyze a dynamic interconnected-pool problem
where each group owns its own stock of natural resources and where property rights on these
resources are neither perfect nor completely absent. Instead, property rights become more
secure as the country accumulates more productive capital.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up our model of depletion of exhaust-
ible natural resources by competing factions and private accumulation. Section 3 gives the
optimality conditions for the open-loop Nash equilibrium outcome of the non-cooperative
differential game. Section 4 shows how the max- min outcome for this game permits an out-
come with constant levels of consumption and output and characterizes the results. Section 5
discusses the homogenous case without competing factions or, alternatively, the case with no
seepage and perfectly secure property rights on natural resources. This results in the familiar
apolitical Hotelling and Hartwick rules where all resource rents are reinvested. Section 6
discusses why in a fractionalized society, prices of natural resources increase too fast, deple-
tion occurs too fast, savings and output are too high, and consumption is too low, especially
if there are many competing factions and the quality of property rights is bad. Section 7
establishes that genuine saving is zero in societies with competing factions in society or
imperfect property rights if welfare-based accounting prices are used to evaluate the cost of
resource depletion. Section 8 discusses the negative adjusted net saving estimates reported
by the World Bank for many resource-rich economies and argues that even these may be
too optimistic if market prices are used instead of accounting prices. Section 9 qualifies the
results and concludes.
2 Competing Factions, Resource Depletion and Capital Accumulation
We set up a model of a closed economy where the national stock of exhaustible natural
resources is owned by rival factions who invest in private capital and manage their own stock
of natural resource in the face of imperfect property rights. There is no population growth.
Each group combines use of its exhaustible resources together with capital (and possibly
labor and other factor inputs in fixed supply) to produce output according to a Cobb-Douglas
production function. To focus on the interactions between asset accumulation and depletion
of exhaustible resources, we abstract from trade between the various groups in society. We
also abstract from open economy considerations such as natural resource exports, imports of
produced goods, and investment in foreign assets.4
4 Within the context of a two-sector general equilibrium model of a small open economy, opening up to
trade induces instantaneous gains from trade but these are eroded by ongoing natural resource depletion and
the steady-state level of utility is lower than under autarky (Brander and Taylor 1997). Within the context of
a two-good, two-country world with national open-access renewable resources, natural resource importers
gain from trade while a diversified natural resource exporter suffers a decline in steady-state utility despite some
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There are thus N rival groups who struggle for power over the control of natural resources.
The depletion of the stock exhaustible natural resource reserves of group i is represented by
the following diffusion process:
S˙i = −Ri +
N∑
j =i
ξ(S j − Si ), Si (0) = Si0, i = 1, . . . , N , (1)
where Ri and Si denote, respectively, the depletion rate and the stock of remaining natural
resource reserves of group i . Dasgupta (2001a, p. 287) has used such diffusion process for
interconnected fields or aquifers before.5 The parameter ξ ≥ 0 indicates the speed of seepage
between the various oil or gas fields or the various linked water aquifers owned by the dif-
ferent groups. If ξ = 0, there is no seepage and the fields of natural resources are physically
completely separate. In that case, there are no elements of a common-pool problem. This
may be realistic for exhaustible gold, silver, diamond and iron deposits, but not for oil, gas or
water deposits. In practice, if neighbors have lower stock of reserves, then oil, gas or water
will seep away to the neighbors’ fields or aquifers. Hence, with seepage, reserves of faction
i increase (decrease) if its level of reserves is lower (bigger) than that of its neighbors. This
means that, due to seepage, reserves of group i increase (decrease) if group i has in the past
depleted relatively more (less) of its reserves than its neighbors. Note that the diffusion pro-
cess (1) is symmetric, which permits an analytically convenient solution. In practice, seepage
may be asymmetric so that it is physically possible that at least some resource owners will
benefit at the expense of other resource owners. Such resource owners would have differing
motives and incentives; we leave the analysis of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium solu-
tion for situations with asymmetric seepage for another occasion. Finally, Eq. (1) underlies
the dynamics of the interconnected pool problem where each pool owner has legal rights to
his pool of resources but nevertheless the pool owner may face non-instantaneous seepage
from or to neighboring pools (i.e., ξ strictly positive and finite). If seepage were instantaneous
(ξ → ∞), it is impossible to enforce property rights and the dynamic interconnected pool
problem reduces to the familiar dynamic common pool problem.
The political and institutional set-up of our model consists of two parts. First, there are a
finite number of competing rival factions in the economy and there is no entry of new factions
or exit of existing factions (no open access). Together with the assumption of a finite and
strictly positive value of ξ , this leads to a dynamic common-pool problem or, to be more
precise, a problem of interconnected private pools. Second, endogeneity of property rights
is introduced in a starkly reduced-form manner. We suppose that property rights improve as
the economy moves along its development path. The evidence reviewed in IMF (2005) offers
support for this supposition. To capture this, we set ξ ≡ ξ ∗ /K , where ξ∗ ≥ 0 indicates
the given initial degree of insecurity of property rights and K is the aggregate capital stock.
This captures that quality of property rights improves as societies become more advanced
and have bigger stocks of aggregate capital. The parameter ξ thus indicates the ease by
which property rights on natural resources can be encroached.6 As property rights improve
Footnote 4 continued
initial gains from trade (Brander and Taylor 1998). The welfare consequences of opening up to free trade
may thus well be negative.
5 The main difference is that Dasgupta (2001a) solves a partial equilibrium problem, whereas we perform a
macroeconomic general equilibrium analysis. Furthermore, he characterizes the first-order optimality condi-
tions whereas we offer a full solution.
6 With very strong property rights it may be possible to claim back the value of what has seeped through to
neighbours, but this is unlikely to stand up in the courts. Hence, we exclude this possibility.
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along a development path, the extent of common-pool or interconnected-pools externalities
diminish.7
Integration of (1) shows that the time path of exhaustible resource depletion must satisfy:
∞∫
0
⎡
⎣Ri (t) −
∑
j =i
ξ
(
S j (t) − Si (t)
)
⎤
⎦ dt ≤ Si0, i = 1, . . . N (1′)
where t denotes time and Si0 the initial stock of natural resource reserves owned by
group i . Note that for the aggregate economy, the resource depletion equations become
S˙ ≡ ∑Ni=1 S˙i = −R, S(0) = S0 ≡
∑N
i=1 Si0, R ≡
∑N
i=1 Ri and
∫ ∞
0 R(t)dt ≤ S0, where
R stands for aggregate resource depletion and S for the aggregate stock of remaining natural
resource reserves.
Each group i also accumulates assets Ki . Since we abstract from adjustment costs, taxes,
etc., the relative price of financial assets is unity and their value exactly equals the capital
stock. The capital stock of each group can be viewed as physical capital or human capital.
Each group i employs capital, natural resources Ri and labor Li to produce output Yi . The
production function for each group Yi = F(Ki , Li , Ri ) satisfies the Inada conditions and
constant returns to scale. Natural resources are necessary for production, so that output from
production is zero (strictly positive) if natural resource use in production is zero (strictly
positive), that is F(Ki , Li , 0) = 0 and F(Ki , Li , Ri ) > 0 for all Ri > 0. Natural resources
are essential if consumption Ci along any feasible program becomes zero as stock of nat-
ural reserves run out. Natural resources are inessential for production if there is a feasible
program along which consumption is bounded away from zero as stocks of natural resource
reserves run out (i.e., lim
t→∞ Ci (t) > 0 as limt Si (t) = 0), so feasible consumption does not
vanish as natural resources run out. If there are sufficient substitution possibilities between
resources and capital or labor, positive levels of output can be generated by switching from
resource-intensive to capital-intensive modes of production. With a CES production function
and an elasticity of substitution greater than unity, F(Ki , Li , 0) > 0 holds and thus natural
resources are not necessary for production. Since exhaustibility of natural resources does not
pose a problem, they are trivially inessential if the elasticity of substitution between factors of
production exceeds unity. If the elasticity of substitution is less than unity, capital accumula-
tion cannot compensate for the inevitable decline in the use of natural resources. Output and
consumption must thus decline to zero. Natural resources are essential for production and the
economy is doomed. We therefore assume that each group has a Cobb-Douglas production
function with a unit elasticity of factor substitution and a share of capital in value added
greater than that of natural resources, i.e., Yi = K αi Rβi L1−α−βi , α > β > 0, α + β < 1.
Natural resources are thus necessary, but not essential for production.8 We abstract from
depreciation of capital. Each group supplies inelastically 1/N of labor, so that aggregate
labor supply is normalized to one. If consumption by group i is denoted by Ci , the evolution
of private wealth of group i is given by:
K˙i = Yi − Ci , where Yi = K αi Rβi L1−α−βi and Li = 1/N . (2)
We abstract from extraction costs for natural resources. We derive a Nash equilibrium solu-
tion; so that each rival group i when deciding on its optimal depletion level Ri supposes that
7 If property rights would not improve as the capital stock grows, resource extraction would be even more
rapacious and it is not feasible to sustain a constant level of consumption.
8 If α < β, capital does not add enough to production to compensate for the declining use of natural resources
and sustain a positive level of consumption. Resources are then essential for production.
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the depletion levels of the other factions R j , j = i, remain constant. In modern macroeco-
nomic theory, agents typically maximize the following intertemporal utility function:
Ui =
∞∫
0
u(Ci ) exp(−ρt)dt, u(Ci ) = C1−1/θii /(1 − 1/θi ) if
θi = 1, u(Ci ) = ln(Ci ) if θi =1, (3)
where ρ indicates the pure rate of time preference employed by each group and θi ≡
−u′(Ci )/Ci u′′(Ci ) > 0 denotes the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for group i .
The coefficient of relative intertemporal inequality aversion corresponds to 1/θi (and also
corresponds to the coefficient of relative risk aversion). In our context group i chooses Ci
and Ri to maximize (3) subject to the evolution of its natural resource stock (1), the evolution
of its capital stock (2) and the Nash conjecture that the depletion rates by the other groups
in society, R j , j = i , do not change when deciding on the optimal level of Ri . In contrast to
modern macroeconomic theory, the economic theory of sustainability in face of exhaustible
resources supposes that agents have infinite intertemporal inequality aversion. This is the
limiting case of (3) as 1/θi → ∞ or θi → 0 and in the limit corresponds to maximizing the
intertemporal utility function:
Ui = u (Arg Min [Ci (t),∀t ≥ 0]) , (3′)
which corresponds to max- min or Rawlsian preferences. The reason resource economists use
(3′) rather than the more general specification (3) with θi > 0 is that for any intertemporal
problem with a positive discount rate ρ > 0 and a strictly positive θi , consumption Ci vanishes
asymptotically to zero as time goes to infinity and natural resource stocks run out (Dasgupta
and Heal 1979, Chapter 10.3); also see Sect. 4. It is hard to defend that very distant gener-
ations end up consuming nothing and therefore attention is focused at Rawlsian preferences
corresponding to (3) with θi → 0 or equivalently to (3′) which corresponds to θi = 0.
3 Optimality Conditions for the Dynamic Common-Pool Problem
We derive for this non-cooperative differential game an open-loop Nash equilibrium solu-
tion.9 The resulting solution will be summarized in Proposition 1. The Hamiltonian for group
i maximizing (3) subject to (1) and (2) is defined by
Hi ≡ u(Ci ) + λi
[
K αi R
β
i
(
1
N
)1−α−β
− Ci
]
− μi
⎡
⎣Ri −
∑
j =i
ξ
(
S j − Si
)
⎤
⎦ , (4)
where λi and μi denote the marginal utility for group i of an extra unit of capital and natural
resources, respectively. Application of Pontryagin’s maximum principle yields the following
first-order conditions for each of the groups:
9 In the absence of property rights whatsoever (i.e., ξ∗ → ∞), one has an open-access common exhaustible
resource whose development is given by S˙ = −∑Ni=1 Ri , S(0) = S0.The open-loop Nash equilibrium out-
come then yields the efficient solution which also prevails in a homogenous society without rival factions. The
feedback Nash equilibrium yields an inefficient solution with too fast extraction of the common exhaustible
resource and sub-optimally low levels of consumption and high levels of saving and output (van der Ploeg
2010). Our general equilibrium results are akin to earlier results on the efficiency of the open-loop solution
for an open-access problem in partial equilibrium when demand for resources is iso-elastic (Reinganum and
Stokey 1985). Note that the Cobb-Douglas production function in our general equilibrium analysis gives rise
to a constant elasticity of demand for natural resources as well.
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∂ Hi
∂Ci
=u′(Ci ) − λi=0, ∂ Hi
∂ Ri
=β Yi
Ri
λi − μi=0, ρλi − λ˙i=∂ Hi
∂Ki
=α Yi
Ki
λi ≡ riλi
and ρμi − μ˙i=∂ Hi
∂Si
= − (N − 1)(ξ ∗ /K )μi , i=1, . . . , N . (5)
The following transversality conditions should also be satisfied:
lim
t→∞
[
exp (−ρt) λi (t)Ki (t)
] = 0 and lim
t→∞
[
exp (−ρt) μi (t)Si (t)
] = 0, i = 1, . . . , N .
(6)
Equation (5) implies that the marginal product of natural resources βYi/Ri should equal
the price of natural resources, pi ≡ μi/λi . Furthermore, the marginal product of capital
αYi/Ki should equal the rate of return on capital for each group ri . Since in symmetric
equilibrium the interest rates and natural resource prices are the same for each group, we
drop group subscripts (i.e., r = ri and p = pi , i = 1, . . ., N ) and write these efficiency
conditions as:
p˙
p
= r + (N − 1) ξ∗
K
where p = β Yi
Ri
, r = α Yi
Ki
, i = 1, . . . , N , and K ≡
N∑
i=1
Ki .
(7)
Equation (7) is the political variant of the Hotelling rule. If there is no fractionalization of
society (i.e., N = 1) or property rights on natural resources are completely secure (ξ∗ = 0),
Eq. (7) reduces to the familiar Hotelling rule which states that the expected rate of increase
in natural resources should equal the market rate of interest. This follows from the follow-
ing arbitrage condition. On the margin, each group should be indifferent between keeping
natural resources under the ground and receiving an expected capital gain p˙/p, and digging
the resources up, selling them, and investing the proceeds and receiving a rate of return r .
Rival groups in society, however, drive a wedge in the Hotelling rule. The reason is that each
group consumes more today; they think that if they conserve their resources, their neighbor
will consume more tomorrow.10 This version of the Hotelling rule implies a bigger rate of
increase in the price of natural resources than is socially optimal. This distortion appears
to be smaller if the groups have accumulated a lot of non-resource wealth, but in the Nash
equilibrium solution with constant levels of consumption and output (derived in Sect. 4) the
rate of interest also falls as the capital stock rises over time. Equation (7) thus indicates that
the rate of change of natural resource prices is inversely related to the capital stock. It exceeds
the rate of interest in a fractionalized society, but over time this intertemporal wedge in the
Hotelling rule asymptotically vanishes as society accumulates increasing amounts of capital
and property rights improve. We also see from (7) that political distortions in the Hotelling
rule causing too rapid extraction and too rapid increases in the price of resources are more
severe if initial property rights are more insecure (higher ξ∗).
First-order conditions (5) also imply the Keynes-Ramsey rule for growth in consumption:
C˙i
Ci
= θi (ri − ρ) if θi > 0 and C˙i = 0 if θi = 0. (8)
10 Since any group i takes the extraction rate of the other group j = i as given in the open-loop Nash equi-
librium, group i does not expect that by delaying her own extraction she causes other groups to extract more
of the resource. However, seepage implies that, if extraction is delayed, the stock of i will be higher than that
of groups j = i and thus more of stock of i will seep to the fields of groups j = i .
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4 Sustaining Consumption in the Dynamic Common-Pool Problem
A well-known problem with utilitarian Benthamite utility functions and positive discounting
is that the optimal program implies a time path of consumption that first rises, then declines,
and vanishes asymptotically or, alternatively, declines at the outset and vanishes asymptot-
ically (e.g., Dasgupta and Heal 1979, Chapter 10.3). There is thus at most one peak, which
is further away in the future if the discount rate is smaller. An outcome where generations
in the distant future consume almost nothing is hard to defend from an ethical and political
point view. Hence, the exhaustible resource literature often focuses attention at max- min
egalitarian outcomes, where all future generations are treated equally and enjoy the same
level of consumption. This is the approach we will adopt as well and we therefore assume
zero elasticities of intertemporal substitution (i.e., θi = 0), which correspond to a Rawlsian
social welfare function.11
We therefore look for dynamic general equilibrium paths with constant levels of con-
sumption, Ci (t) = C/N > 0,∀t ≥ 0 with aggregate consumption C > 0 a constant to be
determined. To obtain a Nash equilibrium solution with constant levels of consumption and
output, we suppose a constant savings rate s and hypothesize the feasible program:
Ki (t) = sYi (t) t + Ki0 > 0, ∀t ≥ 0, (9)
where for each group i we have that Ki (0) = Ki0 is the initial private stock of productive
capital and the output level of each group Yi (t) > 0 is a positive constant. We will now
verify that this hypothesized program (9) indeed satisfies the optimality conditions of the
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium (5), (6) as well as (1), (2). Since investment is constant
in such a program, output of each faction Yi (t) = sYi (t) + C/N and aggregate output
Y ≡ ∑Ni=1 Yi = sY + C = C/(1 − s) are constant as well. Making use of the political
Hotelling rule (7) and the production function in (2), we obtain
p˙
p
= Y˙
Y
− R˙
R
= −
(
1 − β
β
)
Y˙
Y
+
(
α
β
)
K˙
K
= αY + ξ ∗ (N − 1)
K
, (10)
which gives the savings rate of each group as a diminishing function of aggregate output:
s ≡ K˙
Y
= β
[
1 + ξ ∗ (N − 1)
αY
]
≥ β. (11)
This is a political variant of the Hartwick rule, which says that a fractionalized economy with
insecure property rights saves more than its natural resource rents. This wedge in the political
Hartwick rule is bigger in societies with lower levels of output, worse property rights and a
larger number of rival factions. The apolitical Hartwick rule, in contrast, applies to a homog-
enous society or one with perfect property rights and states that all revenues from natural
resource should be reinvested, so that s = β. We note from (10) and R = Y 1/β K −α/β that
R˙
R
= −α
β
K˙
K
= −αsY
βK
or R˙(t) = −
(
α
β
)
sY
1+β
β (K0 + sY t)−
(
α+β
β
)
. (12)
Integrating (12) and solving for the aggregate level of natural resource depletion yields
R(t) = R(0) −
[
K −α/β0 − (K0 + sY t)−α/β
]
Y 1/β = (K0 + sY t)−α/β Y 1/β, (12′)
11 An alternative is to rethink the axiomatic foundation of intertemporal preferences from an ethical point of
view. One suggestion is the framework of sustainable discounted utilitarianism which imposes the requirement
that the evaluation is insensitive to the interests of the present generation if the present is better off than the
future generation (Asheim and Mitra 2009).
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where the second identity follows from using the production function. The equilibrium solu-
tion must asymptotically deplete all natural resources, since any unused resources can be
used to boost the sustainable level of consumption of any group. The solution must thus
satisfy (1′) with equality. Using the aggregate version of (12′), ∫ ∞0 R(t)dt = S0, this implies
that
S0 = Y
1
β
∞∫
0
(K0 + sY t)−α/βdt =
(
β
α − β
)
Y
1−β
β
sK
α−β
β
0
. (13)
Equation (13) yields the aggregate level of output and, using R(0) = Y 1/β K −α/β0 , also
aggregate use of natural resources, both as increasing functions of the savings rate:
Y =
[
s
(
α − β
β
)
K
α−β
β
0 S0
] β
1−β
and R(0) =
[
s
(
α − β
β
)
K −(1−α)0 S0
] 1
1−β
. (14)
A higher initial stock of natural resources permits a higher level of output and thus neces-
sitates a higher level of initial resource depletion. A higher stock of productive capital also
permits more production, but requires a lower level of initial resource depletion. A higher
savings rate boosts output and thus boosts initial resource use as well.
The Nash equilibrium solution can be obtained by solving (11) and (14). Figure 1 uses the
downward-sloping savings locus (11) denoted by SS and the upward-sloping output locus
(14) indicated by YY together with the initial resource use locus RR defined by R(0) =
Y 1/β K −α/β0 to solve for the equilibrium savings rate, aggregate output and the initial rate
of resource depletion. We see that a higher initial stock of capital or higher initial reserves
of natural resources allows higher levels of production, for a given savings rate, and thus
shifts out the output locus. As a result, the economy ends up with a higher level of output,
a lower savings rate and a higher level of sustainable consumption. We see that a bigger
initial stock of natural resources boosts the initial rate of resource depletion and lifts up the
whole trajectory of resource depletion while a higher initial stock of productive capital can
be shown to reduce the initial rate of natural resource depletion.
On the other hand, more competing factions in society or less secure property rights on
natural resources drive a wedge in the political Hartwick rule (11) and thus shift up the saving
locus. It follows that society ends up with a higher savings rate and a higher level of output.
Despite the higher output, a more fractionalized society or a society with less secure property
rights sustains a lower level of consumption. It is also clear that the initial rate of natural
resource depletion is higher, which is a consequence of the more rapid increase in natural
resource prices and more rapacious resource depletion.
We now establish the properties of the Nash equilibrium solution more formally.
Proposition 1 The open-loop Nash equilibrium solution is characterized by a constant
savings rate and constant levels of sustainable consumption and output:
s = s
( −
K0,
−
S0,
+
ξ∗, +N
)
, Y = Y
( +
K0,
+
S0,
+
ξ∗, +N
)
and C = C
( +
K0,
+
S0,
−
ξ∗, −N
)
. (15)
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Output Y
Savings 
rate s 
Initial 
resource 
use R(0) 
RR 
SS′ (higher N or higher ξ*)
SS 
YY     YY ′ (higher S0) 
β
Fig. 1 Solving for aggregate output, initial resource use and the savings rate. Key More fractions or less
secure property rights shift the savings locus from SS to SS′, so the savings rate, output and initial resource
use increase. A higher stock of initial natural resource reserves shifts the output locus YY to YY′, so the
savings rate falls while output and initial resource use increase
The transformation of exhaustible natural resources into productive capital to sustain constant
levels of consumption and production requires a declining stock of natural resource reserves,
S(t) = S0
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
K0 + ϒ
( +
ξ∗, +N
)
t
K0
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
−
(
α−β
β
)
→ 0 as t → ∞, (16)
and a linearly increasing trajectory of the aggregate capital stock
K (t) = K0 + ϒ
( +
ξ∗, +N
)
t, (17)
where sY ≡ ϒ
( +
ξ∗, +N
)
denotes national savings. The declining path of natural resource
use is:
R(t) =
[
K0 + ϒ
( +
ξ∗, +N
)
t
]−
(
α
β
)
Y
( +
K0,
+
S0,
+
ξ∗, +N
) 1
β
with
R(0) = R
( −
K0,
+
S0,
+
ξ∗, +N
)
. (18)
Prices of natural resources p = βY/R increase forever; initially they increase at a faster pace
than the market rate of interest, especially if ξ ∗ (N − 1) is large, but this wedge vanishes
asymptotically:
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p(t) = βY
( +
K0,
+
S0,
+
ξ∗, +N
)1−1/β [
K0 + ϒ
( +
ξ∗, +N
)
t
]α/β
and
p˙(t)
p(t)
= r(t) + ξ ∗ (N − 1)
K (t)
=
αϒ
( +
ξ∗, +N
)
β
[
K0 + ϒ
( +
ξ∗, +N
)
t
] . (19)
The initial price of natural resources is given by:
p(0) = P
( +
K0,
−
S0,
−
ξ∗, −N
)
. (20)
The rate of interest r = αY/K declines over time and vanishes asymptotically. The signs of
the partial derivatives given in (15)–(20) indicate the comparative statics.
Proof By construction the solution (15)–(20) satisfies the depletion Eqs. (1) and (1′), the
capital accumulation Eqs. (2) and the first-order conditions (5): (15) follows from solving
(11) and (14); (16) follows from integrating (18); (17) comes from substituting the solutions
for s and Y into (9); (18) is derived from substituting the solution for R(0) into (12′); (16) is
obtained by integrating (18) using (1′) and making use of (13) and R(0) = Y 1/β K −α/β0 ; (19)
comes from substituting (15) and (17) into (7) and making use of (11); and (20) follows imme-
diately from p(0) = βY/R(0) = K α0 R
( −
K0,
+
S0,
+
ξ∗, +N
)−(1−β)
. We note from (17) that the
transversality condition (6) on the Ki , i = 1, . . . , N is satisfied provided ρ = r∗ > 0.
The transversality condition (6) on the resource stocks are also satisfied, since from (16) we
see that S(t) vanishes as t → ∞. We have thus established that the hypothesized solution is
an open-loop Nash equilibrium solution. To establish the comparative statics properties, we
totally differentiate (11) and (14) and solve:

dY =
(
α − β
1 − β
)(
Y
K0
)
dK0 +
(
β
1 − β
)(
Y
S0
)
dS0+
(
β2
αs(1 − β)
)
d[ξ ∗ (N − 1)]

ds = −
(
βξ ∗ (N − 1)
αY 2
)[(
α − β
1 − β
)(
Y
K0
)
dK0 +
(
β
1 − β
)(
Y
S0
)
dS0
]
+
(
β
αY
)
d[ξ ∗ (N − 1)],
where
 ≡ 1 + [β2ξ ∗ (N − 1)]/[αsY (1 − β)] ≥ 1.For C = (1 − s)Y, sY andR(0) =
Y 1/β K −α/β0 we get:

dC =
(
1 − s
1 − β +
βξ ∗ (N − 1)
αY (1 − β)
)[
(α − β)dK0
K0
+ β dS0
S0
]
−
[
β(s − β)
α(1 − β)
]
d[ξ ∗ (N − 1)]

dϒ =
(
s
1 − β −
βξ ∗ (N − 1)
αY (1 − β)
)[
(α − β)dK0
K0
+ β dS0
S0
]
+
[
β
α(1 − β)
]
d[ξ ∗ (N − 1)]
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dR(0) = −
{(
1 − α
1 − β
)
+
(
α
β
)
(
 − 1)
}
R(0)
(
dK0
K0
)
+
(
R(0)
1 − β
)(
dS0
S0
)
+
(
β R(0)
αsY (1 − β)
)
d[ξ ∗ (N − 1)].
where we note from (11) that the first term in brackets on the right-hand side of the equation
for 
dϒ vanishes. Given that α > β, the signs of the partial derivatives in (15)–(20) follow
immediately from these expressions. unionsq
We only have a meaningful solution with positive levels of aggregate consumption, output
and saving/investment while natural resource reserves decline if capital is more important
in production than natural resources. If α < β, output cannot be sustained at a constant
level with a finite stock of natural resources even if all of output is saved. Consequently,
private consumption eventually vanishes.12 We thus assume α > β. The levels of aggregate
consumption and output that can be sustained are then larger if the initial stock of private
assets and common stock of natural reserves are higher. The initial natural resource price is
low if the initial stock of natural resource reserves is high and the initial capital stock is low.
Over time, natural resource prices increase. This induces continuous factor substitution, so
that gradually the capital stock grows and the use of natural resources declines. Furthermore,
we see from (19) that both the initial natural resource price and its rate of increase are higher
while initial resource depletion is also higher in a more fractionalized society.
Armed with Proposition 1, we can characterize the non-cooperative equilibrium outcome
precisely. Before we discuss this in more detail, we briefly review the apolitical Hotelling
and Hartwick rules and equilibrium outcomes that prevail in a society with no rival factions
(i.e., with N = 1). These are also the outcomes that prevail under a social planner (see
Solow 1974) or in a heterogeneous society with perfectly secure property rights (N > 1 and
ξ∗ = 0).
5 Benchmark: Secure Property Rights or No Rival Factions
Consider a homogenous society without any rival factions or a heterogeneous society with
perfect property rights. In that case, either N = 1 or ξ∗ = 0 and (11) and (14) imply that
s = β, Y =
[
(α − β)S0 K
α−β
β
0
] β
1−β
and C = (1 − β)
[
(α − β)S0 K
α−β
β
0
] β
1−β
. (21)
The saving rate of a homogenous society thus equals the share of natural resources in
value added β. Hence, the value of depleted natural resources is fully saved and invested
(i.e., pR = βY = sY ). This is the celebrated Hartwick rule. Genuine saving is zero when
there are no rival factions or property rights are perfect:
sG(t) ≡ K˙ (t) + p(t)S˙(t)Y (t) =
βY (t) − p(t)R(t)
Y (t)
= 0. (22)
The Hartwick rule thus requires that the depletion of natural wealth is exactly compensated by
accumulation of physical capital, hence genuine saving is zero. By transforming exhaustible
natural resources into productive capital, the country sustains constant levels of consumption,
12 Natural resources are also essential if physical capital depreciates in a radioactive manner, but not if
depreciation is linear or proportional to output.
123
Rapacious Resource Depletion, Excessive Investment 119
output and investment.13 Investment in capital is positive and compensates exactly for the
loss in natural wealth.14 The value of natural resources extracted at each point of time pR does
not change over time, since the depletion level of resources falls at exactly the same rate as the
price of resources appreciates. This rate is, of course, the market interest rate in a homogenous
society, which declines over time and vanishes asymptotically (
.
p /p = − .R /R = r).
6 A Fractionalized Society with Insecure Property Rights
A fractionalized society with insecure property rights saves more than the natural resource
rents, so the saving rate exceeds β. The savings rate is high if there are many rival factions and
less secure property rights. The upward bias in the savings rate is less if aggregate output is
high or, alternatively, if the initial stocks of natural resource reserves and productive capital
are high. The constant level of output is higher in more fractionalized societies with less
secure property rights.15 Nevertheless, due to the higher savings rate, consumption is less
with rival factions and imperfect property rights. The inefficient allocation in this economy
arises from the lack of fully effective property rights for natural resources. It can thus be seen
from Eqs.(16) and (18) that in a fractionalized society with insecure property rights each
group thus extracts natural resources at a too fast a pace,
S˙(t)/S(t) = −R(t)/S(t) = Y
( +
K0,
+
S0,
+
ξ∗, +N
) 1
β
/S0 > Y
( +
K0,
+
S0,
0
ξ∗, +1
) 1
β
/S0, (23)
and hence saves and invests too much and consumes too little. Rapacious rent seeking thus
hurts consumption by the members of each group and harms social welfare.
Since our use of the Cobb-Douglas production function implies that the demand for natu-
ral resources (i.e., R(t) = βY/p(t)) is iso-elastic, natural resource revenues pR = βY stay
constant all the time and are higher if the number of rival factions is higher. The interest rate
is initially higher and then falls more rapidly in a fractionalized society. As a result, natural
resource wealth defined as the present value of current and future resource rents is given by:
∞∫
0
p(t)R(t) exp
⎡
⎣−
t∫
0
r(v)dv
⎤
⎦ dt = βY
∞∫
0
exp
⎡
⎣−
t∫
0
(
αY
K0 + sYv
)
dv
⎤
⎦ dt
= βY
∞∫
0
(
K0
K0 + sY t
) α
s
dt =
(
β
α − s
)
K0 (24)
13 In a competitive market economy without externalities constant genuine saving corresponds to constant
instantaneous utility and thus constant consumption (Dixit et al. 1980). More generally, Hamilton and Withagen
(2007) demonstrate that prescribing genuine saving as a constant positive fraction of output yields a path with
unbounded consumption and higher wealth than the standard Hartwick rule of zero genuine saving and constant
consumption.
14 Capital grows ad infinitum while the interest rate and the depletion rate decline to zero. If positive total
factor productivity growth is introduced, there may be a steady state with a positive interest rate and a positive
depletion rate as discussed in Dasgupta and Heal (1974).
15 It may seem odd that theory predicts that output is higher in fractionalized resource-rich societies with inse-
cure property rights, because many of those economies have bad economic performance and are poor. However,
those economies often also suffer from bad institutions, macroeconomic mismanagement, and high volatility
of export commodity prices which tend to worsen economic performance (van der Ploeg and Poelhekke 2009).
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provided that α > s. Natural resource wealth is higher if the number of rival factions is
higher and property rights are less secure (as then s is higher). Note that the value of sell-
ing all reserves at once (i.e., p(0)S0) falls short of the present value of current and future
oil revenues in fractionalized societies with imperfect property rights, since using p(0) =
βY/R(0) = βK α0 R(0)β−1 and substituting R(0) from (14) and then comparing with (24)
we obtain
p(0)S0 =
[
β2
s(α − β)
]
K0 ≤
∞∫
0
p(t)R(t) exp
⎡
⎣−
t∫
0
r(v)dv
⎤
⎦ dt =
(
β
α − s
)
K0. (25)
We thus see that in homogenous societies or in fractionalized societies with perfect property
rights, the market value of the initial stock of natural resource reserves exactly equals the
present value of current and future resource revenues (as then s = β and (25) holds with
equality). However, if there are competing factions and property rights on natural resources
are badly defined, the savings rate is higher than predicted by the Hartwick rule (s > β) and
depletion of natural resources is rapacious as indicated by (23). This too rapid selling off of
natural resource reserves is triggered by the value of resource reserves in the ground being
less than the present discounted value of all current and future resource revenues.
Total wealth consists of financial capital, human wealth (i.e., the net present value of the
return on the fixed factor)16 and natural resource wealth. Human wealth is proportional to
natural resource wealth and equals (1 − α − β)K0/(α − s). Total initial wealth can thus be
written as
K0 +
(
1 − α − β
α − s
)
K0 +
(
β
α − s
)
K0
=
(
1 − s
α − s
)
K0 =
∞∫
0
C exp
⎡
⎣−
t∫
0
r(v)dv
⎤
⎦ dt > K0. (26)
It thus follows that resource wealth, human wealth, and total wealth are all higher in a frac-
tionalized society with insecure property rights (and thus a too high value of s from a social
optimum perspective). Hence, the present discounted value of the stream of current and future
sustainable consumption which exactly equals total initial wealth must be lower in such a
society as well. Interestingly, (26) and Proposition (1) indicate that fractionalization and less
secure property rights boosts the savings rate and thus boost total initial wealth. Still, we
know from (15) that consumption decreases if there are more rival factions and property
rights become less secure. The reason is that the propensity to consume out of initial total
wealth,
C(t)(
1−s
α−s
)
K0
≡  = 1∞∫
0
exp[−
t∫
0
r(v)dv]dt
= (α − s)s β1−β
[(
α − β
β
)
S0
] β
1−β
K
α−1
1−β
0 , (26′)
16 Human wealth can also be interpreted as the value of land, i.e, the present discounted value of land rents.
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is lower in a fractionalized society with insecure property rights.17 In fact, this more than
offsets the higher total initial wealth. Hence, consumption is lower despite higher initial total
wealth. The intuition is as follows. Even though the interest rate is initially higher, it falls
more rapidly in a fractionalized society and eventually becomes less than in a homogenous
society. Consequently, the present value of the lower level of the stream of constant con-
sumption levels is higher despite the lower level of sustainable consumption. Finally, despite
natural resource reserves being depleted all the time, natural resource wealth, human wealth,
financial wealth and thus total wealth increase throughout as the capital stock rises and the
interest rate falls as time proceeds.
7 Genuine Saving in Resource-Rich Economies with Market Failures
The economy with competing factions has an imperfect mechanism for resource alloca-
tion and thus yields an inefficient allocation with too rapid extraction and too low levels
of consumption from a social point of view. One can then apply the theoretical framework
for national accounting in economies with imperfect allocation mechanisms developed by
Dasgupta and Mäler (2000), Dasgupta (2001b) and Arrow et al. (2003) to our economy. They
show that the sign of the genuine saving indicator in a model with two capital goods (not
unlike the present model) depends on the accounting price of the natural resource in terms of
capital. This accounting price equals the relative effect of a marginal increase in the initial
stock of natural resources on the social objective function divided by the relative effect of a
marginal increase in the initial capital stock on the social objective function.
In our model all groups in society have a Rawlsian max- min objective function (3′). Since
we know that the intertemporal preferences of all groups are aligned, the social objective
function will be max- min as well. Equation (15) gives an expression for sustainable con-
sumption C(K0, S0, ξ∗, N ), which indicates social welfare. Since only the relative price
matters, the numeraire for the social welfare indicator does not matter. The appropriately
corrected accounting price of natural resources, pG(0), to be used in calculating genuine
saving is thus given by
pG(0) ≡ ∂C(K0, S0, N )/∂S0
∂C(K0, S0, N )/∂K0
=
(
β
α − β
)
K0
S0
, (27)
where the partial derivatives in the proof of Proposition 1 have been used to derive (27).
Following Arrow et al. (2003), we define the genuine savings ratio as sG(0) ≡ [K˙ (0) +
pG(0)S˙(0)]/Y (0) and prove that it is zero.
Proposition 2 Genuine saving is zero in fractionalized societies with insecure property
rights.
Proof We use (1) and (11) and then substitute (27) to write
sG(0) = [sY(K0, S0, N ) − pG(0)R(0)]/Y (0) = s −
(
β
α − β
)
K0 R(0)
Y (0)S0
.
Substituting Y (0) = K α0 R(0)βand R(0) from (14), we obtain sG(0) = 0. unionsq
17 Note that ∂
∂s
= (αβ − s)
(
α−s
s(1−β)
)
s
β
1−β
[(
α−β
β
)
S0
] β
1−β K
α−1
1−β
0 < 0 as s > β > αβ. Since s is higher
in a fractionalize society with insecurity property rights, it follows that  must be lower in such a society.
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It is interesting to note that, if the welfare-based accounting price is used to value the stock
of natural resource reserves, the value of reserves under the ground thus calculated exactly
equals the present discounted value of current and future natural resource revenues,
pG(0)S0 =
∞∫
0
p(t)R(t) exp
⎡
⎣−
t∫
0
r(v)dv
⎤
⎦ dt =
(
β
α − s
)
K0 ≥ p(0)S0, (25′)
whereas (25) indicates that the market values of reserves falls short of that. We also note that
the accounting price pG(0) as function of the relative stock of physical capital to natural
resources for a fractionalized society with insecure property rights is exactly the same as the
market price of natural resource in a homogenous society or in a society with perfectly secure
property rights, that is p(0) =
[
β2
s(α−β)
]
K0
S0 ≤ pG(0) and equals (27) only if N = 1, ξ∗ = 0
and thus s = β from (11). This reflects that the trajectory of physical capital and natural
resource in (K , S)-space are exactly the same in the homogenous and fractionalized societies.
This is why genuine saving is zero and not negative and why development in this economy
with competing factions and insecure property rights on natural resources is sustainable.
The problem from a social perspective is that movement along this trajectory is too fast in a
fractionalized society, thus leading to an inefficiently low constant level of sustainable con-
sumption. Hence, both the rate of depletion of natural resources and the rate of investment
occur are too high and are the same, so that genuine saving will be zero while the level of
sustainable consumption is too low.18
The World Bank (2006) calculates, however, its empirical estimate of ‘genuine saving’
with the actual market price, hence it is now more appropriately called ‘adjusted net saving’.
Arrow et al. (2003) stress that relying on market observables to infer social welfare can
be misleading in imperfect economies. Expression (25′) implies that, if the World Bank
uses the market price p(0) with N > 1 and ξ∗ > 0 instead of the welfare-based account-
ing price pG(0) (i.e., p(0) with N = 1 or ξ∗ = 0), it would use too low prices as the
accounting price pG(0) that should be used for calculating genuine saving is higher than
the market price p(0), especially if there are many competing factions and property rights
are more insecure.19 Hence, the World Bank estimates of adjusted net saving would in our
framework show up as positive for a fractionalized society with imperfect property rights:
sW BG =
sY − pR
Y
= s − β = β
[
ξ ∗ (N − 1)
αY
]
> 0 if N > 1 and ξ∗ > 0. (22′)
Since Proposition 2 states that the welfare-based measure of genuine saving should be zero,
our theory suggests that the World Bank estimates of adjusted net saving over-estimate gen-
uine saving for countries with many rival factions and insecure property rights.
8 Puzzle: Biases in Empirical Measures of Genuine Saving
So how far do our theoretical predictions of (i) low levels of sustainable consumption,
(ii) excessive depletion rates due to squabbling about the appropriation of natural resources,
18 This result is independent of the particular parameterization linking property rights to the capital stock,
since the result of zero genuine saving is also obtained in a model where rival groups are tapping a common
natural resource with no property rights at all (van der Ploeg).
19 With α = 0.4, β = 0.1(0.3) and N = 5, the accounting price should be a half (quarter) of the market
price.
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Fig. 2 Gross investment and ethnic fractionalization in resource-rich countries. Source International Country
Risk Guide and World Bank Development Indicators
(iii) excessive investment rates, and (iv) zero genuine saving rates, especially in fractionalized
resource-rich economies with poor legal systems, stand up to the stylized empirical facts?
As far as (i) is concerned, there is plenty of evidence that resource-rich countries show poor
growth performance after controlling for quality of institutions, openness, the investment rate
and initial income per capita (Sachs and Warner 2000; van der Ploeg 2010b). There is also
plenty of evidence that resource-rich countries suffer from rapacious resource depletion and
conflict (e.g., Lane and Tornell 1996; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; van der Ploeg 2010b), which
is not inconsistent with rapacious resource depletion predicted by (ii). The weak correlation
reported in Fig. 2 is not inconsistent with hypothesis (iii) that investment rates are higher in
resource-rich economies that are more fractionalized and have less secure property rights.
Much of this investment may not only be excessive but also of bad quality. For example,
politicians may have incentives to invest too much in partisan poor-quality projects (‘white
elephants’) to prevent potential rivals spending the resource revenues once they get booted
out of office (e.g., Robinson and Torvik 2005; Collier et al. 2010).
Our main concern is, however, that prediction (iv) of zero genuine saving rates, especially
in fractionalized resource-rich economies, is flatly rejected by the data. Dasgupta and Mäler
2000 show that under a social planner, genuine saving equals the increase in wealth of the
nation and that realizing the constant max- min level of consumption demands zero genu-
ine saving.20, 21 Proposition 2 shows that zero genuine saving also results in fractionalized
economies with insecure property rights provided the welfare-based accounting prices are
used, which leads to our hypothesis (iv). Any depletion of natural resources or damage done
by stock pollutants must thus be compensated for by increases in non-human and/or human
capital.
20 In fact, Dasgupta (2001a) shows that wealth per capita is the correct measure of social welfare if the
population growth rate is constant, per capita consumption is independent of population size, production has
constant returns to scale, and current saving is the present value of future changes in consumption.
21 The Hartwick rule is related to Hicksian real income. Asheim and Weitzman (2001) and Sefton and Weale
(2006) show that the rule ensures no change in the present discounted value of current and future utility and
requires use of the Divisia index of real consumption prices. Capital gains represent the capitalization of the
future changes in factor prices and thus constitute a transfer from one factor to another. In the closed economy
net gains are zero and should not be included in real income.
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Fig. 3 Adjusted net saving and oil and gas rents. Source World Development Indicators
Correctly measured genuine saving data are unfortunately not available. However,
adjusted net saving data are available and we know from Eq. (22′) in Sect. 7 that these
data over-estimate correctly measured genuine saving. With this caveat in mind, consider
the adjusted net saving figures reported by Hamilton and Hartwick (2005); Hamilton et al.
(2005) and the World Bank (2006).22, 23 Looking at the estimates of adjusted net savings
calculated by the World Bank for the year 2006, restricting attention to natural resources
that are prone to seepage, namely oil and gas, and leaving out other resources which are not
prone to seepage (minerals, coal, forestry, etc.), the scatter diagram and estimated regres-
sion line in Fig. 3 indicate that countries with a large percentage of oil and gas rents of
GNI typically have negative adjusted net saving rates.24 Many countries thus become poorer
each year despite having abundant natural resources. They squander their natural resource
wealth without investing sufficiently in other forms of intangible or productive wealth. This
may explain why oil-rich Venezuela enjoyed negative economic growth while Botswana,
Ghana and China with positive adjusted net saving rates benefit from substantial growth.
Highly resource-dependent Nigeria and Angola have adjusted net saving rates of −30%,
thus impoverishing future generations. The oil/gas states of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbe-
kistan, Turkmenistan and the Russian Federation also have negative adjusted net saving rates.
Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago and Gabon might have been as wealthy as South Korea if
they would have reinvested their resource rents. All these countries (except Trinidad and
Tobago) have suffered declines in per capita income from 1970 to 2000.
Section 7 states that true figures of genuine saving are likely to be more negative in frac-
tionalized societies with poor property rights, hence making it even more likely that prediction
(iv) is rejected by the data. Indeed, Fig. 4 suggests that countries with a share of oil and gas
22 Adjusted net saving is calculated as public and private saving at home and abroad, net of depreciation,
plus current spending on education to capture changes in intangible human capital minus depletion of natural
exhaustible and renewable resources minus damage of stock pollutants (CO2 and particulate matter).
23 These measures are increasingly used in empirical work on the natural resource curse (e.g., Ding and Field
2005; Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008; Alexeev and Conrad 2009), so it is important to understand what these
figures refer to.
24 The stylized facts look qualitatively the same when we use 2003 data or when we include a broader measure
of natural resources consisting of bauxite, copper, iron ore, lead, zinc, phosphates, silver, gold, brown coal,
hard coal, tin, and nickel as well.
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Fig. 4 Adjusted net saving and ethnic fractionalization in resource-rich countries. Source International
Country Risk Guide and World Bank Development Indicators
rents greater than 20% have more negative adjusted net saving rates if they have a high degree
of ethnic fractionalization. Internal conflict and high levels of corruption are also associated
with negative adjusted net saving rates in resource-rich countries.
The negative adjusted net saving rates reported by the World Bank for resource-rich coun-
tries are cause for concern, especially as the true figures are even more negative once we
allow countries having group rivalry and insecure property rights. In the real world, rapacious
resource depletion often goes hand in hand with excessive reinvestment of resource rents,
possibly of a poor quality. Many of the poorest resource-rich countries can thus not sustain
consumption, especially if they also need to save to fight off high population growth rates and
declining wealth per capita (e.g., World Bank 2006, Table 5.2). Such countries need positive
rather than zero genuine saving to maintain constant consumption per head, since they are
on a treadmill and need to save more than their resource rents. Unfortunately, adjusted net
saving World Bank estimates suggest that they rarely manage that.
Although our predictions (i), (ii) and (iii) about poor economic performance, rapacious
resource depletion and excessive investment have some empirical relevance, the above dis-
cussion indicates that prediction (iv) is at variance with the stylized fact of negative genuine
saving. The puzzle of explaining negative genuine saving is thus still a challenge for fur-
ther research. One possibility is that countries save less than their natural resource rents and
postpone extraction if they anticipate future world prices of resources to rise as discussed in
Asheim (1986), Asheim (1996) and Vincent et al. (1997). But Hamilton and Bolt (2004) show
that the adjustments to allow for changes in future resource prices are small if historical price
trends are extrapolated. If resource-rich countries expect the future cost of natural resource
extraction25 or future government spending to fall, it is also optimal to have negative genuine
saving rates. An alternative explanation of negative genuine saving might be that fighting
about natural resources implies foregone labor income and induces corruption and erosion
of the legal system. This implies waste and discourages saving and investment in productive
25 US historical experience suggests that under the right circumstances anticipated falls in extraction costs and
thus the downward effect on the nation’s saving is substantial. US supremacy as mineral producer was driven
by big falls in exploration costs from the mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth century, collective learning, leading
education in mining/engineering/metallurgy, increasing returns, private initiative and an accommodating legal
environment; see Habbakuk (1962) and David and Wright (1997).
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capital as in Hodler (2006). Infighting about natural resources is further exacerbated by short-
sighted politicians who are less concerned with the extreme intergenerational equity concerns
implied by the assumption of Rawlsian preferences customary in the literature on exhaustible
natural resources. The existing literature on the political economy of resource-rich countries
highlights the role of rulers and their incentives (e.g., Caselli 2006; Caselli and Cunnigham
2009) and the role of absorption constraints and excessive investment in partisan illiquid
investment projects (e.g., Robinson and Torvik 2005; Collier et al. 2010), which will give
useful hints in the quest for a theory that might explain the puzzle of negative genuine saving.
9 Conclusion
What happens to national saving and investment if legal systems function badly and rival
groups deplete exhaustible natural resources with imperfectly defined property rights? With
perfect property rights, the country would transform its exhaustible resources into productive
capital by reinvesting all resource rents (the Hartwick rule) and thus sustain constant levels
of consumption and output. The rate of appreciation of the price of natural resources would
equal the interest rate (the Hotelling rule), which gradually decreases over time as the capital
stock grows. Resources are depleted steadily, but natural resource wealth increases through-
out nevertheless. Matters are very different in fractionalized societies with insecure property
rights. Although the country still manages to sustain constant levels of consumption and
output, these levels are sub-optimally low. Imperfect property rights induce common-pool
externalities, which drive the rate of appreciation of the price of natural resources at a too high
a pace. The rapacious depletion that ensues is driven by the value of resource reserves in the
ground being less than the present discounted value of current and future resource revenues.
Substitution of natural resources for productive capital thus occurs too fast, the saving and
investment rates are too high, and extraction of natural resources too rapid compared with the
social optimum. Both the rate of depletion of natural resources and the rate of investment in
productive capital occur too fast and at the same rate, hence genuine saving is zero. Despite
resource wealth, human wealth and total wealth being higher, sustainable consumption is
lower. The reason is that the propensity to consume out of total wealth is sufficiently lower
to offset the higher total wealth. People really are worse off in terms of having to make to do
with a lower level of sustainable consumption, especially in countries with a large degree of
fractionalization and poor legal systems.
Our theoretical predictions of poor economic performance, rapacious resource depletion
and excessive investment have some empirical relevance, but our prediction of zero genuine
saving rates is rejected by the data. Indeed, adjusted net saving indicators for many resource-
rich countries as calculated by the World Bank are negative, and the true genuine saving
figures will be even more negative as true accounting prices (i.e., the market prices that
would prevail in a society with perfect property rights) rather than the lower market prices
should be used when calculating genuine saving. This is a real worry, especially for countries
which should be saving more than their resource rents to cope with high population growth
rates. The empirically observed negative genuine saving rates are a puzzle, since our theory
did take account of erosion of the legal system and infighting about natural resources.
To explain this puzzle, one needs to introduce political economy features that can explain
why natural resource revenues are not fully or not efficiently re-invested in the economy.
For example, natural resource revenues may be siphoned off by short-sighted political elites
and their cronies who less concerned about intergenerational equity and thus resource reve-
nues will not reach the people. Furthermore, natural resource bonanzas may induce exuberant,
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unsustainable public spending, based on the erroneous premise that windfall natural resource
revenues are permanent, and painful adjustments when the windfall ceases. Also, property
rights may depend not only on the aggregate capital stock, but also on whether the capital
stock of one group is bigger than that of rival groups which may enable the group to better
protect its natural resources but also may make rival groups more apt to steal their resources.
Fighting and weapon investments by the various groups would then depend positively on
the size of natural resources to be captured and negatively on the opportunity cost of labor
when it is not fighting. Wasteful fighting and investment in weapons or partisan, illiquid
projects may well lead to negative genuine saving rates. Finally, politicians seek office and
grab resource rents for themselves or to pay off political opponents and get away with it due
to poor institutions, bad legal systems and poor checks and balances in the political system.
Rapacious rent seeking implies that many resource-rich, fractionalized countries with poor
legal systems squander their natural resource rents and suffer disastrous economic and social
outcomes. It may even be that the extra rents that are not captured are not fully saved and
invested, thus leading to negative genuine saving and impoverishment of the country.
References
Alexeev M, Conrad R (2009) The elusive curse of oil. Rev Econ Stat 91(3):586–598
Arrow KJ, Dasgupta P, Mäler K-G (2003) Evaluating projects and assessing sustainable development in imper-
fect economies. Environ Resour Econ 26(4):647–685
Asheim GB (1986) Hartwick’s rule in open economies. Can J Econ 19:395–402
Asheim GB (1996) Capital gains and net national product in open economies. J Public Econ 59:419–434
Asheim GB, Weitzman ML (2001) Does NNP growth indicate welfare improvement. Econ Lett 73(2):233–
239
Asheim GB, Mitra T (2009) Sustainability and discounted utilitarianism in models of economic growth,
Mathematical Social Sciences, forthcoming
Brander JA, Taylor MS (1997) International trade and open-access renewable resources: the small open econ-
omy case. Can J Econ 30(3):526–552
Brander JA, Taylor MS (1998) Open access renewable resources: trade and trade policy in a two-country
model. J Int Econ 44:181–209
Brunnschweiler C, Bulte E (2008) The resource curse revisited and revised: a tale of paradoxes and red her-
rings. J Environ Econ Manag 55(3):248–264
Caselli F (2006) Power struggles and the natural resource curse, mimeo. London School of Economics
Caselli F, Cunnigham T (2009) Leader behaviour and the natural resource curse. Oxf Econ Pap 61(4):628–650
Collier P, Hoeffler A (2004) Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxf Econ Pap 56(4):563–595
Collier P, van der Ploeg F, Spence M, Venables AJ (2010) Managing resource revenues in developing econ-
omies. IMF Staff Pap 57(1):84–118
Dasgupta P (2001) Human well-being and the natural environment. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Dasgupta P (2001) Valuing objects and evaluating policies in imperfect economies. Econ J 111:C1–C29
Dasgupta P, Heal GM (1974) The optimal depletion of exhaustible resources. Review of Economic Studies
Symposium, pp 3–28
Dasgupta P, Heal GM (1979) Economic theory and exhaustible resources. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, UK
Dasgupta P, Mäler K-G (2000) Net national product, wealth, and social well-being. Environ Dev Econ 5:69–93
Dasgupta PS, Mitra T (1983) Intergenerational equity and efficient allocation of exhaustible resources. Int
Econ Rev 24:133–153
David PA, Wright G (1997) Increasing returns and the genesis of American resource abundance. Ind Corp
Change 6:203–245
Ding N, Field BC (2005) Natural resource abundance and economic growth. Land Econ 81(3):496–502
Dixit AP, Hammond P, Hoel M (1980) On Hartwick’s rule for regular maximin path of capital accumulation.
Rev Econ Stud 47:551–556
Groot F, Withagen C, de Zeeuw A (2003) Strong time-consistency in the cartel-versus-fringe model. J Econ
Dyn Control 28(2):287–306
123
128 F. van der Ploeg
Habbakuk HJ (1962) American and British technology in the nineteenth century. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, UK
Hamilton K, Bolt K (2004) Resource price trends and development prospects. Portuguese Econ Rev 3:85–97
Hamilton K, Hartwick JM (2005) Investing exhaustible resource rents and the path of consumption. Can J
Econ 38(2):615–621
Hamilton K, Ruta G, Tajibaeva L (2005) Capital accumulation and resource depletion: a Hartwick rule
counterfactual. Policy Research Working Paper 3480, World Bank, Washington, DC
Hamilton K, Withagen C (2007) Savings growth and the path of utility. Can J Econ 40(2):703–713
Hartwick JM (1977) Intergenerational equity and the investing of rents from exhaustible resources. Am Econ
Rev 67(5):972–974
Hodler R (2006) The curse of natural resources in fractionalized countries. European Econ Rev 50:1367–1386
Hotelling H (1931) The economics of exhaustible resources. J Polit Econ 39:137–175
IMF (2005) Chapter III, Building institutions, World Economic Outlook. International Monetary Fund,
Washington, DC
Karp LS (1992) Social welfare in a common property oligopoly. Int Econo Rev 33:353–372
Kuralbayeva K, van der Ploeg F, Venables AJ (2010) Management of resource revenues in the CAREC region:
the many faces of the natural resource curse, Oxcarre Policy Paper 6, University of Oxford, prepared for
the Asian Development Bank
Lane PR, Tornell A (1996) Power, growth and the voracity effect. J Econo Growth 1(2):213–241
Reinganum JF, Stokey NL (1985) Oligopoly extraction of a common property natural resource: the importance
of the period of commitment in dynamic games. Int Econ Rev 26(1):161–173
Robinson JA, Torvik R (2005) White elephants. J Pub Econ 89(2–3):197–210
Sachs J (2008) Common wealth, economics for a crowded planet. Allen Lane, London
Sachs JD, Warner AM (2000) Natural resource abundance and economic growth. In: Meier G, Rauch J (eds)
Leading issues in economic development. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Sefton JA, Weale MR (2006) The concept of income in a general equilibrium. Rev Econ Stud 73:219–249
Solow RM (1974) Intergenerational equity and exhaustible resources. Review of Economic Studies Sympo-
sium, pp 29–45
Tornell A, Lane PR (1999) The voracity effect. Am Econ Rev 89(1):22–46
van der Ploeg F (1987) Inefficiency of credible strategies in oligopolistic resource markets with uncertainty.
J Econ Dyn Control 11:123–145
van der Ploeg F (2010) Voracious transformation of a common natural resource into productive capital.
Int Econ Rev 51(2):365–381
van der Ploeg F (2010b) Natural resources: curse or blessing?. J Econ Lit (to appear)
van der Ploeg F, Poelhekke S (2009) Volatility and the natural resource curse. Oxf Econ Pap 61(4):727–760
Vincent JR, Panayotou Th, Hartwick JM (1997) Resource depletion and sustainability in small open
economies. J Environ Econ Manag 33:274–286
World Bank (2006) Where is the wealth of nations? Measuring capital for the 21st Century. International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, Washington, DC
123
